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 With the push to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and replace it with 
the American Health Care Act (AHCA), there is renewed interest in using 
tax credits to increase health insurance coverage. A similar tax credit-
driven policy, the Health Insurance Tax Credit (HITC), was implemented 
from 1991 to 1993. To date, only one paper (Cebi & Woodbury, 2014) 
has analyzed the effectiveness of the HITC in increasing health insurance 
coverage. This paper re-examines the efficacy of the HITC by using a 
different data set from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). This examination yields similar results to those in Cebi & 
Woodbury (2014), which is that the HITC increased health insurance 
coverage among single mothers by about 6.6 percentage points. Further, 
this study finds that the HITC appeared to influence the rates of usage of 
health care services. This paper concludes by discussing the implications 
of these findings for the broader debate surrounding health care reform 
in the present moment.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Health insurance access and affordability continues to dominate the 
political landscape in the United States. A significant component of the debate 
regarding health care reform is the change in the amount and eligibility for 
receiving tax credits in purchasing health insurance. On March 6th, 2017, Speaker 
of the House Paul Ryan unveiled the highly anticipated health care plan, the 
American Health Care Act (AHCA), as an alternative to the current Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). One key difference between the ACA and AHCA is that the 
AHCA explicitly relies on tax credits to prompt people to purchase coverage, as 
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it removes a provision of an individual mandate. To be more specific, while tax 
credits are still refundable, the AHCA offers a flat dollar amount that varies by age 
and phases out at a higher level of income. Due to this, the AHCA provides lower 
tax credits for low income populations than the ACA. As a result, the new plan is 
projected to decrease enrollment among low-income families (CBO Report, 2017)
Although the AHCA was pulled from the floor when it was first 
introduced, the House of Representatives passed a new version of the bill in early 
May 2017. The AHCA shares some similarities with an earlier bill, the Health 
Insurance Tax Credit (HITC), implemented in the U.S. from 1991 to 1993. Both 
bills are designed to use tax credits as a way to motivate individuals to sign up for 
health insurance. This paper revisits the HITC in order to analyze the effectiveness 
of tax credits in the acquisition of coverage and utilization of medical services.
It is important to note that there exists a difference between the current 
situation and the period in which the HITC was implemented. In the HITC, some 
people were given subsidies that they did not have before. In contrast, if we 
transition from the ACA to the AHCA, most of the previous tax credit eligible 
individuals will receive less assistance in subsidizing the cost of health insurance. 
Although the overall circumstances of tax credits offered under the HITC differed 
from what is offered under the current law and proposed legislation, it provides 
a natural experimental setting to explore the responsiveness of tax credits, which 
has implications for the larger health care debate of the present moment. To date, 
only Cebi and Woodbury (2014); (C&W hereafter) has explored the effectiveness 
of the HITC on increasing health insurance coverage.
This paper replicates C&W with different data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) and expands that analysis to include health care 
utilization, as this is what ultimately matters to policy makers. It is reasonable 
to hypothesize that if low-income populations experienced a significant increase 
in insurance enrollment, health care utilization in the HITC period might have 
subsequently increased.
This expanded replication study reaffirms that tax credits influence 
a person’s decision-making regarding health insurance and appear to increase 
health care utilization. This paper begins by outlining the empirical strategy of 
the HITC. The next section describes the data set used in this study. Finally, this 
paper concludes with an analysis of results and a discussion of their implications.
1.1. Methods
1.1.1. Empirical Strategy
The HITC, enacted from 1991 to 1993, was a supplemental form 
of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and based on the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990. Participants could receive a refund even if they 
had no federal tax liability. Because the HITC had similar criteria to that of the 
EITC, private health insurance was required to cover at least one qualified child, 
who had to satisfy two requirements: “(1) be a child, stepchild, grandchild, 
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foster (i.e. cared for as own child) or adopted child of the taxpayers and (2) 
have the same place of residence as the taxpayer for more than half of the tax 
year ”(C&W). Those enrolled in either non-group or employer-provided private 
insurance plans were eligible for the HITC, which was structured to vary by 
earned income. For example, if one’s income was from $1 to $7,140, they would 
have received 6 percent of their income.
If one’s income was between $7,140 and $11,250, the credit would stay 
constant at $428 in 1991 ($451 in 1992, and $465 in 1993) on top of basic EITC. 
Income up to but not exceeding $21,250 would make an individual eligible for 
the HITC. The average amount received by HITC-qualified individuals was 
quite modest at 23 about percent of the overall average cost for health insurance 
premiums (GAO, 1994).
To examine how the HITC affected single mothers, I follow C&W and 
use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy. The DiD estimates the effect of 
the HITC on the outcomes of interest by comparing the average change in the 
outcome variables for the treatment group with that of the control group. This 
assumes that the trend in the outcomes for both groups would have been the 
same without the HITC. Therefore, any deviation from this trend is attributed 
to the policy.
Following C&W, my treatment group is working single mothers not 
exceeding a high school education and the control group is working single 
women, without children, not exceeding a high school education.
My primary outcome of interest health insurance coverage is based on 
the following SIPP questions:
−− ‘Was the respondent covered by a private health insurance plan and 
under their own name?’
−− ‘Besides the respondent, were there any other children in the household 
covered by the respondent’s plan?’
For the control group, I define respondents as covered if they answered 
’yes’ for the first question.Within the treatment group, they were defined as 
covered if they answered ’yes’ to both questions. In the baseline specification, I 
include the primary background characteristics in C&W. I estimate the  following 
equation using the linear probability model (OLS):
Yist = β0 + β1 ∗ TREATist + β2 ∗ DuringHITCit + β3 ∗ TREAT∗ DuringHITCist 
+ β4 ∗ Zist + γ1*URTst + γ2∗URTst ∗TREATi + γ3∗θs + εit         (1)
where i, t and s index individual, time (years) and state, respectively.
The outcome variables of interest, Yist, are binary variables indicating 
whether the individual (i) in state (s) at time (t) was covered by private health 
insurance under the respondent’s own name and had visited a physician at least 
once in the previous year. TREATist  is equal to unity if she was a single mother. 
Otherwise, it is 0. DuringHITCit is a dummy variable for the years from 1991 to 
1993. It is equal to 0 if the years are from 1989 to 1990. TREAT∗ DuringHITCist 
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is equal to unity, only if the individual (i) is in the treatment group, and the tax 
year is 1991, 1992 or 1993. The coefficient of interests are β1, β2  and β3.  β1 
would be negative if single mothers in general have less accessibility to health 
insurance and health care service than single women without children. To put it 
differently, it explains the preexisting difference in outcome variables between 
single mothers and single women without children. 
As the percentage of coverage decreased over the analyzed period, I 
would also expect estimate of β2 to be negative. Estimate of β3 denotes the 
effect of the HITC. If there was a relatively positive increase in the treatment 
group’s outcome of interests during the HITC period, estimate of β3 is expected 
to have a positive sign. Zist controls for individual characteristics. It includes 
race, age, earned and unearned income, work status, number of children in the 
household, and metropolitan residency. I also include state fixed effect (θs), 
year specific state unemployment rate (URTst), and the interaction of URTst and 
TREATi dummy. If the coefficient of this interaction term is positive, it suggests 
that single mothers are less susceptible to the business cycle in purchasing health 
insurance and utilizing health care service.
1.1.2. Data
I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). Households are interviewed once every four moths and answered about 
the previous four mononths. Within each SIPP panel, the sample is randomly 
divided into four groups. One rotation group is interviewed each month and 
after all rotation groups complete their first interview, the first wave of the panel 
concludes. This continues for eight waves of each panel over the course of three 
years (SIPP Users’ Guide, 2001).
For each SIPP panel, I select a wave that represents each year from 
1989 to 1993. I use of single women drawn from the third wave of the 1990 
to 1993 panels (September to December for each year) and the sixth wave of 
the 1988 panel (September to December in 1989). The data that I use provides 
more point-in-time information of an individual’s health insurance coverage 
status, allowing me a lower possibility of inaccurate recall than the Current 
Population Survey that C&W employed.  I chose these waves because they 
include corresponding questions about health care utilization. Specifically, they 
include a proxy of health care utilization i.e. information on yearly physicians’ 
visit which represents a key indicator of access to care, regardless of income 
level (Shi and Starfield, 2001).
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the control and treatment 




Summary Statistics for Low-Educated Working Single Mothers with Children 
and Single Women Without Children, 1989-1993
Variables Single Women Single Mothers
Statistically 
Different
Age (in years) 32.6 32.8
(8.28) (6.87)
% w/<12 years of education .152 .305 ***
(.360) (.460)
% w/=12 years of education .847 .694 ***
(.360) (.460)
Number of Kids 0.00 1.85 ***
- (1.07)
% White .765 .559 ***
(.424) (.495)
% Black .151 .306 ***
(.359) (.460)
% Others .083 .134 ***
(.276) (.340)
% Full Employed, Full -Month .661 .469 ***
(.474) (.498)
% Full Employed, Part -Month .004 .007
(.066) (.088)
% Part Employed, Full-Month .240 .250 **
(.430) (.434)
% Part Employed, Part-Month .034 .033
(.183) (.178)
Earned Income (Monthly $ 1491 968 ***
at the time of the interview) (977) (859)
Unearned Income (Monthly $ 79.7 177 ***
at the time of the interview) (825) (367)
% Metropolitan Area .800 .717 **
(.401) (.449)
% Unemployment Rate in one’s State 6.30 6.41
(1.47) (1.45)
Observations 1,025 1,755 2,780
***: statistically significant at 0.01 level
** : statistically significant at 0.05 level
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Weighted by SIPP individual weights. 




Health Insurance Coverage Rates & Annual Office Visits for Low-Educated 
Working Single Mothers with Children and Single Women without Children, 
1989-1993
Outcome of Interests 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
Single Mothers with Children 
(Treatment Group)
Private Health Insurance under own 
name .550 .465 .476 .420 .401
(.032) (.026) (.033) (.026) (.027)
Private  Health Insurance under  
own name
.447 .416 .421 .376 .352
that covers child (covered) (.029) (.024) (.034) (.024) (.027)
Office Visits (%) .675 .685 .679 .679 .701
(.040) (.023) (.037) (.030) (.031)
Observations 228 502 270 383 372 1,755
Single Women without Children 
(Control Group)
Private  Health Insurance under  
own name
.722 .762 .690 .651 .680
(covered) (.044) (.025) (.037) (.029) (.035)
Office Visits (%) .686 .783 .678 .656 .751
(.032) (.027) (.030) (.021) (.024)
Observations 131 288 174 233 199 1,025
Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted by SIPP individual weights.
Overall, during this analyzed period, Table 2 demonstrates that the 
percentage of coverage for single mothers with low levels of education fell from 
43.12% (the combined average from 1989 to 1990) to 38.3% (the combined 
average from 1991 to 1993), while the insurance coverage for the control group 
decreased from 74.2% (the combined average from 1989 to 1990) to 67.4% 
(the combined average from 1991 to 1993). This falling trend for both groups, 
in general, shows the decrease in demand and opportunity to access employer-
provided health insurance during the recession period around 1991, especially 
for single women. The first outcome of interests is whether a working single 
mother has private health insurance in her own name that covers her children, 
since the HITC could only offset the price of health insurance that covers a 
qualified child. As an extension toward measuring the indirect effect of the HITC 
on health care utilization, a relative change in office visits at least once during 
the previous year for single mothers from 1991 to 1993 is another outcome of 
interest.
Because of the multistage-stratified sampling of the SIPP, I report both 




2.1.1. Effects on Coverage Rates
Table 3, columns 2-3, comprise the main findings of this paper, and indicate 
that health insurance coverage rates were greater by about 6.6 percentage points 
than otherwise would have been for single mothers from 1991 to 1993. If we take 
the estimate for the number of the HITC eligible families headed by working single 
mothers with low education levels from the 1991 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
(i.e., 2,485,000) and the estimated coverage increase of about 6.6 percentage points, 
there would be an increase in enrollment by about 149,100 people because of the HITC 
who would have otherwise not enrolled in health insurance. Even with a different data 
set, my results are very similar to that of C&W (column 1, Table 3) who estimated 
an increase in coverage rates of about 4.7 percentage points due to the HITC; this 
supports that tax credits for health insurance effectively increased the coverage for low 
income populations. 
In addition to this, Appendix Table 1 shows the event history analysis where 
I disaggregated the HITC effect by years to explore whether the estimated HITC 
effect did have the same magnitude in all three years. This shows that the magnitude 
of the HITC effect on the outcome of interest changed over time during the HITC 
period. Further, leaving out the interaction term of 1989 and the treatment dummy, 
there was no significant pre-treatment effect in 1990, possibly supporting the validity 
of the common trend assumption. As we need an assumption that both treatment and 
control groups should experience a similar trend, if there were any significant effects 
on the treatment group before the HITC enactment (Ashenfelter Dip) (i.e. strategically 
postponing the purchasing insurance), it would overestimate the effect of the HITC.
Table 3
Main Estimates from Equation (1)
covered by private health insurance (1) (2) (3)
Cebi et al. 
(2014)
WLS OLS
Treat -.128*** -.088 -.016
(.024) (.071) (.065)
During HITC -.142*** -.019 -.033
(.001) (.004) (.040)










R-squared 0.336 0.406 0.400
Notes: (2) and (3) specifications include age, race, number of children, work 
status, unearned income, earned in- come, state unemployment rate, interaction 
term between treat group and state unemployment rate. State-clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. Full set of covariates are available from the author.
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In Table 4, I verify the robustness of the results by considering additional 
specifications. First, given that respondents may adjust their incomes in order to 
be eligible for the HITC (Elissa and Hoynes, 2006), I explore equation (1) without 
using income as a measure. While I exclude income controls, I consider education 
level and labor union membership instead. The results are in Table 4, columns 
1-2; they are comparable to the results that include income (Table 3, columns 2-3).
Second, there were statewide reforms that may have differentially 
impacted both groups (i.e., state Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
reforms (AFDC) and state own-EITCs). AFDC was reformed by restricting time 
limits on welfare eligibility as well as adding work requirements that drew single 
mothers into the labor force.  Also, several states implemented their own EITC 
standards during the HITC period. Changes in the EITC at the state level provide 
an additional source of exogenous variation by which to measure the impact of 
the credit on coverage (Baughman, 2005). As such, following C&W, in Table 4, 
columns 3-4 do not include states that had AFDC reform and columns 5-6 exclude 
states that had their own EITC benefits. Overall, though the magnitudes of effect 
slightly changed, Table 4 suggests that the responsiveness of the HITC on health 
insurance coverage rates is robust.
Table 4
Robustness Check
covered by private 
health insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS
Treat -.117 -.035 -.039 .048 -.100 -.029
(.090) (.083) (.076) (.063) (.089) (.082)
During HITC -.023 -.038 -.048 -.071 -.005 -.022
(.042) (.042) (.043) (.038) (.045) (.045)
Treat*During 
HITC
.065 .061 .096** .098*** .043 .037
(.040) (.039) (.040) (.036) (.044) (.045)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,755 2,780 2,352 2,372 2,485 2,508
R-squared .356 .358 .366 .404 .350 .397
Notes: All specifications include age, race, number of children, work status, 
dummy for high school graduates and union membership, state unemployment 
rate, interaction term between treat group and state unemployment rate. (3) 
and (4) are the results based on the states that did not have welfare reform. (5) 
and (6) are the results based on the states that did not have own EITCs. State-




2.1.2. Effects on Health Care Utilization
Using equation (1) with utilization as an outcome variable, Table 5 shows 
the effect of the HITC on the probability of visiting a physician (i.e., the extensive 
margin effects on care demand). Because the frequency of utilization can be 
confounded with the individuals’ health status, I define utilization as a visit to the 
physician at least once per year. The primary reason for this is that using the exact 
number of visits might lead to biased estimates of the effect of the HITC on health 
care utilization. As Currie (1996) explains, the estimates might be downward biased 
if the improved health status is an omitted variable: “Increase in insurance coverage 
rates may have increased access to hospital or physicians’ office visits, while they 
could have increased the use of preventive care, enhancing health status and reducing 
the demand for hospital care.” One way to mitigate this issue is by focusing on 
utilization that is explicitly preventive and unaffected by health status. Physicians’ 
visits for routine check-ups are recommended once a year for people of average age 
and health status. Therefore, I used at least one office visit per year as a proxy for 
health care utilization, since the absence of a visit to a physician in the previous year 
suggests a true access problem, regardless of health status.
To estimate the effect on utilization, I use the same control variable 
specification as Table 3; corresponding results are in Table 5, columns 1-2.  Columns 
3-4 use an alternative specification (i.e., excluding income measures, while including 
education and union membership). Overall, Table 5 displays the increase in coverage 
translated into a statistically significant increase in physicians’ visits. The magnitude 
and effect size are relatively large compared to the increase in coverage (6.6 
percentage points). Therefore, it could be unreasonable to attribute this effect solely 
to the HITC. Additional contributing factors on utilization might include Medicaid 
and EITC expansions in the early 1990s.
Table 5
Annual Office Visits from Equation (1)
Office Visits (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
WLS OLS WLS OLS
Treat .132 .158 .122 .154
(.099) (.105) (.094) (.101)
























R-squared .046 .042 .041 .039
Notes:  (1) and (2) specification includes age, race, number of children, work 
status, unearned income, earned income, state unemployment rate, interaction 
term between treat group and state unemployment rate. (3) and (4) specification 
excludes income controls but includes dummy for high school graduates and 
union membership. State-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Full set of 




After several months of disputes to repeal the ACA, on March 24th, 
2017, House Republicans pulled the proposed replacement plan. While many 
parts of the replacement plan are controversial, the reliance on tax credits is a 
central feature. As such, by replicating a previous study on the HITC, my results 
add to the evidence that offering tax credits is an effective method for increasing 
coverage and therefore, hold relevance for current debates around health policy.
The HITC did in fact lead to a coverage increase of about 6.6 percentage 
points. A 6.6 percentage point relative in- crease in coverage implies that the 
price elasticity of health insurance is calculated to be -0.8, which is greater than 
that of C&W (-0.42). To estimate price changes in health insurance for the HITC 
eligible individuals, surveys conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office were used. These estimates suggest that there was a 26 percent reduction 
in the price of health insurance for the HITC recipients in 1991. Therefore, the 
6.6 percentage relative (to single women without children) increase described in 
this paper suggests a 20.8 percent increase in coverage among single mothers. In 
other words, without the HITC, only 31.7 percent of single mothers would have 
been covered compared to 38.3 percent with the HITC. However, it is important 
to explore why the effect was not larger. One possible explanation could be that 
the modest amount of the tax credit was not enough to incentivize eligible, low-
income populations to enroll (GAO, 1994). If this is the case, then it is arguable 
that under the AHCA, which offers an even smaller credit than the ACA (and 
also the HITC if converted into current dollar value) to low-income populations, 
the financial burden will be greater for eligible people and enrollment in 
coverage will decrease further. In connecting these findings to the ACA and the 
AHCA, it is important to note that differences still exist between these plans 
and the HITC. For example, in 1991, the phase-out range starts from an annual 
income of over $11,250.  However, under the current proposal, the phase-out 
range begins at $75,000 for single individuals (i.e., approximately $42,323 in 
1991), and includes more people who have a relatively higher income.
The other possible explanation would be the insufficient outreach 
and publicity regarding the HITC. This problem is also documented with the 
ACA health insurance marketplaces, as about half a million fewer people 
signed up for insurance into 2017, under the Trump Administration, than would 
have with the level of outreach and publicity that was seen under the Obama 
Administration. The third possible reason would be the liquidity constraint (i.e., 
cash-flow problems for low income families) resulting from timing mismatch. 
The mismatch between the timing of tax credits offered and that of insurance 
premium payments could exacerbate liquidity constraint problem.  It means 
that even though the HITC eligible people would like to receive the tax credit 
benefits, as they only received their credit after filing their tax returns, they might 
more likely to face liquidity problems. This left them unable to take advantage 
of the tax credits (Gruber, 2000).
The finding that there was a non-statistically significant increase in 
utilization under the HITC following the in- crease in enrollment suggests that, 
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for low-income families, the inability to get coverage would be one of the primary 
barriers to truly being able to access preventive care. This demonstrates that tax credits 
for insurance premiums might also be effective at increasing health care utilization. 
Moreover, given this modest increase, it is reasonable to expect that under the AHCA, 
with an anticipated decrease in enrollment, resulting from smaller subsidies for low 
income populations, utilization is also likely to decrease.
Considering the aforementioned results and their respective implications, an 
empirically informed argument for tax subsidies can be made. However, policy makers 
are cautioned against the following: (1) assuming that all subsidies will have similar 
effects on enrollment and utilization, and (2) that subsidies can be conceptualized 
without regard for how they intersect with various elements of the broader policy.  The 
HITC provides an excellent historical case study for these cautions, because despite 
its relative success, due to a lack of appropriate regulations, it was ultimately repealed 
on Dec 31st, 1993. Similar to what was proposed in the AHCA (i.e., removing 10 
Essential Health Benefits of the ACA), the HITC did not specify minimum benefits 
that must be included in insurance plans, enabling insurance companies to abuse this 
policy and sell valueless plans to tax credit eligible individuals (Sanger-Katz, 2017). 
There- fore, for tax credits to be a true incentive to increase health care coverage, they 
must be implemented in tandem with appropriate market regulations.
Overall, this paper provides evidence that tax credits are an effective 
mechanism for increasing health insurance coverage and utilization.  It serves as a 
case study for exploring how tax credits operate in conjunction with larger health care 
policy. While specific contexts should be considered, these findings can be extrapolated 
in further analyses exploring current and future health care policies.
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Appendix Table 1: Event History Analyses























Notes:(1) and (2) are event history analyses and include year dummies from 
1989 to 1993. State-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
